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1 INTRODUCTION 
Economic and social rights have historically been considered to be non-
justiciable
2 
and accordingly less worthy of constitutional protection. This 
category of rights is, as a result, fairly undeveloped in both its content and 
application when compared to civil and political rights. Whilst inter-
national law has recognised socio-economic rights since the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights
3 
in 1 948, this rhetoric has not been matched 
by effective enforcement procedures. Socio-economic rights have, accord-
ingly been regarded as a so-called "second generation" of human rights.
4 
1 This research paper was prepared with financial assistance of the European Union 
Foundation for Human Rights in South Africa. The views expressed herein do not 
necessarily represent the official view of the EU Foundation. The writer wishes to thank 
Sandy Liebenberg and Nico Steytler at the Community Law Centre for their valuable 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper. 
2 Unlike civil and political rights. which could be easily applied by courts and similar 
judicial bodies. economic and social rights were considered to be more political in 
nature as well as costly in their implementation. However. it is now recognised that 
many of the reasons advanced for their non-justiciability were either overstated or 
mistaken. In this regard see Matas 1995: 123. 
3 The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) proclaims civil and political rights 
as well as economic. social and cultural rights. Though the UDHR is not a legally 
binding instrument. many have argued that its provisions form part of customary 
international law. Article 25 is of particular relevance to socio-economic rights. It 
provides: "Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family. including food. clothing. housing. medical care 
and necessary social services. and the right to security in the event of unemployment. 
sickness. disability. widowhood. old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances 
beyond his control." 
4 Economic. social and cultural rights were often argued to constitute a "second generation" 
of human rights. the first generation being civil and political rights. The main distinguishing 










































LAW, DEMOCRACY &. (JEVELOPMENT I 
However. the emerging international trend recognises that economic and 
social rights are a fundamental and indispensable component of human 
rights. s The South African Constitution
6 
has broken new ground in a range 
of socio-economic rights. by its explicit and unequivocal protection of 
these rights.
7 
However. the challenge lies in translating these constitutional 
rights into tangible realities for the people of South Africa. 
In recognition of the difficulty of enforcing the positive duties imposed 
by socio-economic rights primarily through the courts.
s 
the Constitution 
also establishes other mechanisms for their enforcement.
9 
One such 
mechanism is the monitoring function of the South African Human Rights 
Commission.
lo 
Section 184(3) of the Constitution expressly provides that 
the Human Rights Commission must each year require "relevant organs of 
state" to provide the Commission with information on the measures that 
they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights 
concerning housing. health care. food. water. social security. education 
and the environment. This unique domestic monitoring procedure on. the 
factor between both these categories of rights centres around the perceived role of the 
state. It is generally emphasised that civil and political rights require freedom from 
state interference whereas economic and social rights entail positive obligations on the 
state for their protection. Whilst there is some truth in this assertion. it is subject to 
numerous and substantial qualifications. as has been recognised by Eide amongst 
others. See Eide 1995: 15. 
5 For example. the Vienna Declaration of 1993 enjoins the world community to "treat 
human rights globally in a fair and equal manner on the same fOOting and with the 
same emphasis". It further states: "all human rights are universal. indivisible. and 
interdependent and interrelated". The World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action. UN doc. AfCONF. 157/23. Pan I. para 5. 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 Act 108 of 1996 (hereafter the 1996 
Constitution). 
7 These rights include the environment (s 24), access to land, security of tenure and 
restitution (s 25(5) to (9», access to adequate hOUSing (s 26), access to health care 
services, sufficient food and water and social security (s 27), children's socio-economic 
rights (s 28(1)(c). education (s 29) and the socia-economic rights of detained persons 
(s 35(2)(e». 
8 S 34 of the Constitution provides as follows: "Everyone has the right to have any 
dispute that can be resolved by the application of the law decided in a fair public 
hearing before a court or. where appropriate. another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum." However. as most persons still lack the financial resources to 
enforce their socio-economic rights through the courts. lodging complaints with 
institutions such as the South African Human Rights Commission is a cheap, accessible 
and important avenue. 
9 For example, the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), as provided for in s 187 of 
the Constitution, is tasked with promoting respect for gender equality and the 
protection. development and attainment of gender equality. In fulfilling its mandate. 
the CGE may monitor, investigate. research. educate, lobby. advise and report on 
issues concerning gender equality. It can be inferred that the CGE may. in the exercise 
of this mandate. focus on gender equality in access to socio-economic rights. 
10 The Human Rights Commission was established in terms of s 115 of the interim 
Constitution (Act 200 of 1993). S 184 of the 1996 Constitution further recognizes the 
Human Rights Commission as one of the State Institutions Supporting a Constitutional 
Democracy. The Commission is accorded various functions and powers aimed at the 
protection and promotion of human rights in South Africa. These powers and functions 











































. INFO~T:!6N ONSbCio;E:CO~MlC l'UGHTS TO THE SA HUMAN RiGH.TsCOMMTSsION .·,1 
realisation of economic and social rights, is critical to ensuring their proper 
implementation. It allows for an assessment of the progress being made 
in realising the rights, identifying violations of the rights I , as well as the 
possibility of remedial steps in cases of violations. '2 
However, in fulfilling its mandate of monitoring socio-economic rights, 
the Human Rights Commission is faced with a number of challenges. 
Amongst the challenges facing the Human Rights Commission is the task 
of determining which are in fact the relevant organs of state for the 
purposes of the said section. The Commission has recently completed its 
first cycle of monitoring in terms of section 184(3) of the Constitution. It 
interpreted the term "relevant organs of state" to include national depart-
ments that are relevant to the listed socio-economic rights in section 
184(3), all provincial governments and the South African Local Govern-
ment Association (SALGA). The Commission accordingly directed requests 
for information to the national departments of Housing, Health, Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism, Finance, Water Affairs and Forestry, Land 
Affairs, Education, Welfare, Correctional Services and Agriculture, all of 
the provincial governments as well as SALGA. The Commission is 
currently preparing for its second phase of monitoring socio-economic 
rights. 
This paper re-examines the question of who are "relevant organs of 
state" for the second monitoring cycle. It suggests that the "relevant 
organs of state" can be established by identifying the organs of state that 
bear an obligation to realise socio-economic rights. It will argue that 
organs of state that bear a primary responsibility for the realisation of 
these rights, is for the purposes of section 184(3) a "relevant organ of 
state". 
The paper will begin with a definition of an organ of state as well as 
some examples of the types of institutions that will fall within the ambit of 
such definition. Specific attention will then be accorded to organs of state 
that have a primary function to realise socio-economic rights and are 
accordingly relevant organs of state for the purposes of section 184(3). 
The remaining sections of the paper will focus on some practical con-
siderations facing the Human Rights Commission in its task of monitoring 
socio-economic rights. 
11 See Liebenberg 1997: 161. 
12 Should the Human Rights Commission identify a violation of a particular socio--
economic right. it must then decide on appropriate remedial steps in terms of its 
constitutional and statutory powers. These could include: 
• conducting further research and studies on the problem: 
• conducting an investigation; 
• undertaking mediation. conciliation or negotiation; 
• making recommendations on policy or legislation to relevant organs of state; 
• highlighting the violation and factors which. in the opinion of the Human Rights 
Commission. gave rise to it in reports to the President and Parliament; and 










































2 DEFINING AN ORGAN OF STATE 
Section 239 of the Constitution defines an organ of state as follows: 
"Unless the context indicates otherwise -
'Organ of state' means: 
(a) Any department of state or administration in the national, provinCial or 
local sphere of government; or 
(b) Any other functionary or institution -
(i) Exercising a power or performing a function in terms of the 
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) Exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms 
of any legislation but does not include a court or judicial officer." 
Some of the specific institutions or functionaries that constitute an organ of 
state for the purposes of section 239 will be examined in the present section. 
This task involves an analysis of section 239, and an identification of the 
specific bodies that can be regarded as "organs of state" in each subsection. 
2.1 A department of state or administration in the national, 
provincial or local sphere of government 
In view of the express reference in section 239(a) to state departments 
and administration in the national. provincial and local sphere of govern-
ment, it is clear that the state departments and administration within 
these three spheres of government fall within the ambit of an organ of 
state within the meaning of section 239(a). 
As section 239(a) makes specific reference to any department oj state or 
administration as opposed to the legislatures. neither Parliament nor the 
provincial legislatures WOUld, in terms of the section, constitute organs of 
state. However. the section makes it qUite clear that the terms "depart-
ment of state" and "administration" must, at least include the particular 
ministers. ministries and state departments responSible for executing legis-
lation and policies. 
2.2 Any other constitutional functionary or institution 
Section 239(b)(i) refers to "any other functionary or institution exercising 
a power or performing a function in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution". Chapter 9 of the Constitution specifically provides for certain 
State Institutions supporting a Constitutional Democracy. These include 
that of the Public Protector,1J the Human Rights Commission," the Com-
mission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, ReJi~ious 
and Linguistic Communities,'S the Commission for Gender Equality,' the 
Auditor General'1 as well as that of the Electoral Commission.'8 The relevant 
13 S 182 Constitution. 
14 S 184 Constitution. 
15 S 185 Constitution, 
16 S 187 Constitution, 
17 S 188 Constitution. 










































.. INfORMATION OI'lSOCIo-ECONOMIC RIGHTS TOnIE SA HUMAN RIGI·i:rsco~i\~l1SSlbN ... 
sections reveal that each of these state institutions exercise their powers 
and perform their functions in terms of the Constitution. These state 
institutions accordingly qualify as organs of state for the purposes of 
section 239. In addition. as the Public Service Commission. '9 the Financial 
and Fiscal Committee20 and the Central Bank"' also exercise their powers 
and perform their functions in terms of the Constitution. they also qualify 
as organs of state for the purposes of section 239. Whilst it is acknow-
ledged that these are by no means the on(y institutions or functionaries 
that would fall within the parameters of the subsection. these state insti-
tutions would clearly be included within the subsection and accordingly 
constitute organs of state. 
2.3 Any other functionary or institution exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation 
Section 239(b)(ii) refers to "any other functionary or institution exercising 
a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legis-
lation". In interpreting the section, the first question that begs an answer 
is whether the fact that a function is exercised in terms of legislation is in 
itself adequate for it to qualify as a public power or public function. or 
whether some additional criteria are necessary to ensure that it is indeed a 
public function or public power. This will require an inquiry into the 
definition of the terms "public power" and "public function." 
In spite of there existing certain clear situations where an institution or 
functionary performs a public power or public function. there are nu-
merous cases where the answer is far from obvious. In this regard. some 
guidance will be sought from administrative law. As the rules of judicial 
review apply primarily to public bodies exercising public functions or 
public powers. their definitions will be examined in the context of judicial 
review speci fically. 
In examining the boundaries of judicial review pertaining to public 
bodies exercising public powers. it is said that 
"as a general rule. the doings of private individuals and organizations are not 
reviewable by courts of law. while those of public bodies are. This corresponds 
with the notion that public bodies. because they exercise public powers. are 
subject to a sort of public trust which imposes special standards and duties on 
them. Most fundamentally. the law requires them to exercise their powers in 
the public interest. and not arbitrarily and for their own advantage; and more 
generally. they are subject to both the statutory terms on which their powers 
are conferred and to the common law rules imposed on them by the courts ... 22 
Although the excerpt reveals the motivation behind public bodies that ex-
ercise public functions or powers being subject to judicial review. it offers 
19 S 196 Constitution. 
20 S 220 Constitution. 
21 S 223 Constitution. 











































little insight as to the exact definition of a public function or public power. 
Wiechers has suggested various indicators which though not decisive, 
provide some guidance as to whether a public function or public power is 
being exercised.
23 
He has divided these into formal and substantive 
criteria and suggests that if anyone of a set of questions are answered in 
the affirmative, it is adequate for the body to qualify as a "public body" 
and accordingly for its functions and powers to qualify as "public" in 
nature. 
According to Wiechers' formal criteria, anyone of the following questions 
requires an answer in the affirmative for the existence of a public function 
or public power: 
• whether the institution concerned is established by statute; 
• whether the institution falls under the control of a recognised public 
authority; or 
• whether the institution is staffed or funded from public resources. 
Alternatively, anyone of the following substantive criteria he proposes 
reqUires an affirmative answer to establish a public function or public power: 
• whether the institution provides a public service; or 
• whether the institution is endowed with coercive powers which it may 
wield over members of the public. 
In the light of many private organisations rendering public services and 
many private businesses being subsidised by public funds. Baxter points 
out that these criteria are. in fact, inconclusive evidence of the existence 
of a public function. As an alternative. he suggests that the ultimate 
question be whether the institution concerned is under a duty to act in the 
public interest and not simply to act to its own private advantage and. it is in 
the light of this consideration that the rules of administrative law will 
apply.24 Although this test was applied in Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) v 
johannesburg Stock Exchange. 25 it has been criticised by Boulle. Harris and 
Hoexte~6 as being circular in reasoning. They point out that the conclusion 
that a body is under a duty to act in the public interest may well be based 
on the fact that it has already been recognised as a public body. 
More recently. the courts have also had to grapple with the definition of 
an "organ of state" within the meaning of the Constitution.21 In Baloro and 
Others v University oj Bophuthatswana and Others.28 the Supreme Court laid 
down certain factors to be considered for the determination of an organ of 
state. The case dealt with the applicability of fundamental rights in 
Chapter 3 of the interim Constitution to the University of Bophuthatswana. 
23 Baxter 1984: 100. 
24 Baxter 1984: 100. 
25 1983 3 SA 344 (W). 
26 Boulle. Harris and Hoexter 1989: 247. 
27 The Constitutional Court held in Du Plessis v De Klerk. 1996 5 BCLR 658 (cq that 
fundamental rights in the interim Constitution could be invoked against an organ of 
government. but not by one private litigant against another. 










































IINFORMA1;JON ON SOCIQ-ECONOMICRIGHTS TO THE SA HUM~N RIGHTS COMM;SSI9N . 
Section 233(1) of the interim Constitution defines an organ of state as 
"including any statutory body or functionary". In order for the funda-
mental rights in the interim Constitution to be applicable to the University. 
it had to qualify as an organ of state. The Court accordingly undertook an 
examination of the factors that would be necessary for the body to qualify 
as an organ of state which were summarised as follows: 
• Whether the body or functionary is an "organ of state" depends largely 
on the extent to which it is integrated into the structures of authority in 
the state rather than on the nature of the statutory source to which it 
owes its existence. 
• An "organ of state" can be established by a specific statute or else by 
virtue of a general statute providing for the general establishment of 
bodies or functionaries of that kind. 
• Bodies which fulfil public functions. depend on infrastructural support 
by the state and therefore function in close cooperation with structures 
of state authority. as is mostly evidenced by the provision of state 
representation in their management structures. are "organs of state". 
• Private bodies or institutions not established by or by virtue of any 
statute but fulfilling certain of their key functions under the supervision 
of organs of state are also "organs of state".29 
In taking account of the aforementioned factors. the Court held that the 
UniverSity of Bophuthatswana is indeed an organ of state. In support 
thereof. it referred to the University of Bophuthatswana Act 1 0 of 1978 
which makes the University subject to the ultimate exercise of control by 
the Minister of Education and the Executive Council. 
In Directory Advertising Cost Cutters v Minister for Posts, Telecommuni-
cations and Broadcasting and Others30 further attention was accorded to the 
definition of an organ of state under the interim Constitution. The judge 
rejected the test set out in the Baloro case. as being too broad. He pointed 
out that a statutory body per se would not necessarily qualify as an organ 
of state. In support thereof. the Bible Society of South Africa and the 
Methodist Church of Southern Africa were cited as examples of bodies 
which, though created by statute, "can by no stretch of the imagination be 
described as organs of state."ll The Court stressed that the meaning of a 
statutory body must be limited to those bodies which have characteristics 
of organs of state. i e. that they act authoritatively in the exercise of a 
government function or that they exercise their functions subject to the 
control of the state. In the said case. the Court established the test as 
being: 
29 Supra 230F-23I E; 235J-236B; 246F. 
30 1996 3 SA 800 m. The case dealt with the applicability of the fundamental rights under 
the interim Constitution to Telkom South Africa Ltd. In order to determine the 
applicability of these rights to Telkom South Africa Ltd, the Court had to establish 
whether Telkom qualified as an organ of state or not. In applying its test of state 
control. the Court held that Telkom passed the test with "flying colours" to qualify an 
organ of state given the fact that it was an executive organ of government rendering 
public services under the control of the executive. 
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"limited to institutions which are an intrinsic part of government - Le. part of 
the public service or consisting of government appointees at all levels of 
government - national. provincial. regional and local - and those institutions 
outside the public service which are controlled by the state Le. where the 
majority of the members of the controlling bodies are appointed by the state or 
where the functions of that body and their exercise is prescribed by the state to 
such extent that it is effectively in its control"." 
The Court drew the following analogy: 
"Implicit in this definition is that an organ is part of a greater entity, the state. 
as physically an organ is part of the human body. An organ of state is not an 
agent of the State; it is part of government (at all its levels)."» 
In Oostelike Gauteng Diensteraad v Transvaal Munisipale Pensioenefonds en 
'n Ander34 further attention was accorded to the meaning of the term 
"organ of state". The Court applied the test of "control" as laid down in 
Directory Advertising Cost Cutters v Minister for Posts. Telecommunications 
and Broadcasting and Others. However. it observed that this test should not 
be applied rigidly. In applying the test to the joint municipal pension fund. 
the Court held that it was indeed under the control of the state and 
accordingly an organ of state. In support thereof. the Court noted that its 
constitution and rules could only be amended with the approval of the 
state and its entire existence is accessory to the existence of other state 
organs. 
In view of the test laid down in the Directory Advertising case and 
followed in the Munisipale Pensioenefonds case, it is clear that in order for 
an institution or functionary to qualify as an organ of state for the 
purposes of the subsection, it must -
• be established by statute; and 
• be an intrinsic part of government. 
In establishing whether an institution or functionary is an intrinsic part of 
government, it is suggested that the following considerations are of relevance: 
• whether the institution or functionary forms part of the public service; 
• whether the institution or functionary provides a public service; 
• whether the institution or functionary consists of government appoin-
tees; 
• whether the institution or functionary. though outside the public ser-
vice, has the majority of the members of its controlling board appointed 
by the state; 
• whether the functions of that body and their exercise is prescribed by 
the state to the extent that it is effectively in the state's control; or 
• whether the institution is staffed or funded from public resources. 35 
32 Supra SlOF-H. 
33 Supra S09H. 
34 1997 S BCLR 1066 m. 
35 These considerations form a combination some of the criteria suggested by Wiechers 










































INI':ORMATIO!,{ ON:SOCio-ECONOMICRlGHTS TO THE SA HUMAN RlGHTSCOMMTSS!ONI 
In addition. such powers or functions must. in terms of the express wording 
of section 239(b)(ii) be exercised in terms oj legislation in order for it to qualify 
as a public power or public function for the purposes of the said subsection. 
There is a large number of parastatals, most of which are statutory, and 
which are to a greater or lesser degree independent from state depart-
ments. 36 Although they are not part of the administration, they are defined 
as public organisations by virtue of the fact that they owe their origin to 
statutes, and that government controls or has a financial interest in them, 
that they perform a public service or their functions are regulated by 
statute. These include entrepreneurial bodies, regulatory bodies, public 
corporations, control boards and research institutes. 31 Examples of some 
parastatals would include Water Boards. the South African Housing Board 
etc. Although specific parastatals will have to be judged on their own facts, 
it is likely that most may be regarded as organs of state in terms of section 
239, as they are established in terms of statute and clearly meet the 
criteria for their powers and functions to qualify as public in nature. For 
example. parastatals often fall under the control of specific government 
departments, are funded or staffed from public resources or perform a 
public service. For example, as the Development Bank of Southern Africa 
exercises it powers and duties in terms of the Development Bank of 
Southern Africa Act,38 and clearly performs a public service, it would also 
in terms of section 239(b)(ii) of the Constitution qualify as an organ of state. 
3 WHICH ORGANS OF STATE ARE RELEVANT TO THE 
REALISATION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS? 
Having defined the institutions and functionaries falling within the de-
finition of an organ of state in terms of section 239 of the Constitution, the 
present section aims to examine the organs of state that are relevant to 
the realisation of socio-economic rights. Section 8 of the Constitution 
provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, 
the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. 39 Sections 26 and 27 of 
the Constitution provide that everyone has the right of access to adequate 
housing, health care services, including reproductive health care, sufficient 
food and water and social security. These sections further provide that the 
state must take reasonable legislative and other measures Within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of these rights. 
The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "realise" as "to make 
real or realistic; convert into actuality". The term realisation, when applied 
to the present context, refers to organs of state that bear a responsibility 
of converting the socio-economic rights in the Constitution into tangible 
realities. A study of the organs of state that have an obligation to realise 
socio-economic rights will determine the relevant organs of state for the 
purposes of section 184(3). 
36 Baxter 1984: 120. 
37 Baxter 1984: 120. 
38 Development Bank of Southern Africa Act 13 of 1997. 
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3.1 The relevant organs of state within the three spheres of 
government 
3.1.1 National government 
Parliament has the power to, amongst other things, pass legislation with 
regard to any matter, including a matter within a functional area listed in 
Schedules 4 and 5.40 Reference to any matter in the section clearly includes 
all of the socio-economic rights referred to in the Constitution. Further-
more, included in Schedule 4 are many of the specific socio-economic 
rights, such as education, the environment. housing, health care services 
and welfare services. rn addition, the Schedules include many areas that 
are of significant importance or impact substantially on the realisation of 
socio-economic rights. However, although Parliament passes legislation 
relating to socio-economic rights, it does not constitute an organ of state 
in terms of section 239(a). Instead, it is the state departments and 
ministries that have a primary responsibility for implementing legislation 
giving effect to the realisation of the specific socio-economic rights that 
qualify as relevant organs of state. 
It is not possible to classify information concerning socio-economic 
rights into neat compartments corresponding with specific government 
departments. Many departments may have overlapping mandates relating 
to a particular socio-economic right. For example the Department of 
Welfare and Population Development and the Department of Land Affairs 
and Agriculture may be concerned with different aspects of the right to 
food. However, it may be more practical for the Human Rights Com-
mission to request information concerning the various socio-economic 
rights from the government department primarily responsible for the 
particular right (e g to direct the main questionnaire concerning the right 
of access to health care services to the Department of Health). The govern-
ment department in question would then assume responsibility for en-
suring a comprehensive supply of information regarding a specific right. 
These requests for information should be directed to the relevant Minister 
within each department. However. a specific questionnaire should be de-
signed for the Department of Finance as its mandate clearly has a critical 
impact on the realisation of all socio-economic rights. 
3.1.2 Provincial government 
Provincial legislation may pertain to any matter within a functional area 
listed in Schedules 4 and 5, any matter outside those functional areas that 
is expressly assigned to the province by national legislation and any 
matter for which a provision of the Constitution enVisages the enactment 
of provincial legislation." Although such legislation would clearly include 
socio-economic rights, as has already been noted. the provincial legiS-
latures do not constitute an organ of state. Instead, the provincial ex-
ecutive is at the helm of the provincial administration, and is accordingly 
the relevant organ of state in terms of section 239(a). 
40 S 44 (l )(a)(ii) Constitution. 










































•. ··INFORMATION ONSOcIO-ECONOMlC RIGHTS TO THE SA HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION· .1 
In terms of section 125 of the Constitution, the provinces are empowered 
to implement national legislation in respect of Schedule 4 and 5 matters 
unless an Act of Parliament provides otherwise. As has already been 
noted, the functional areas included in these Schedules either coincide 
with the enlisted socio-economic rights in section 184(3) or may impact 
substantially on the implementation of these rights. These factors once 
more point to the fact that the provincial executives exercise vast powers 
and functions with regard to the realisation of socio-economic rights and 
are accordingly relevant organs of state for the purposes of section 184(3). 
As the executive authority of the province is vested in the Premier, it is 
suggested that the Human Rights Commission direct requests for infor-
mation to the Premier. The Premier should then assume responsibility for 
distributing and coordinating the information between the different 
departments that are responsible for the realisation of the enlisted socio-
economic rights. 
3.1.3 Localgovernment 
The objects as well as the developmental duties of local government pro-
vided for in the Constitution, indicate that this sphere of government also 
has a vital role to play in the realisation of socio-economic rights. and is 
accordingly a relevant organ of state, 
The objects of local government include ensuring the provision of 
services to the communities in a sustainable manner, promoting social 
and economic development and promoting a safe and healthy environ-
ment.'2 As the rights concerning housing. healthcare. food. water, social 
security, education and the environment are clearly critical to the very 
essence of promoting social and economic development. it is contended 
that they would clearly fall within the ambit of the objects of local gover-
nment. In addition, for example. the realisation of the right of access to 
sufficient water will fall within the Object of ensuring the provision of 
services to communities. 
Furthermore, section 153 of the Constitution lists the developmental 
duties of local government. included within which is an obligation to give 
priority to the basic needs of the community and promote the social and 
economic development of the community,'l Regarding the actual 
definition of the term development. it has been argued as follows: 
"Defining the concept of development as a fixed and agreed upon phenomena 
is impossible and one should be wary of those who attempt to do so. It is a 
political. normative, and therefore subjective concept that. if unexplained. 
often conceals more than what it reveals. The definition of development that 
we opt for is one that incorporates equity and democracy as the aim of the 
development process and which sees it as the 'satisfaction of people's material 
and strategiC needs' The satisfaction of material needs equates with an 
improvement in the standard of living and the reduction of absolute and 
relative poverty. The, satisfaction of strategiC needs involves empowering 
people and enabling them to take control of their lives. »44 
42 5 152(1) Constitution, 
43 5 153 Constitution. 










































Hence, if one accords the aforementioned definition to the term "deve-
lopment", it is clear that the realisation of socio-economic rights is both an 
integral component to the reduction of poverty as well as improvement in 
one's standard of living. It would follow that as local government has 
certain obligations regarding development and the realisation of socio-
economic rights is fundamental to such development, that local govern-
ment has an important role to play in the realisation of socio~economic 
rights. 
Furthermore, section 153 of the Constitution obliges local government 
to give priority to the basic needs of the community. In making a 
determination as to what the basic needs of the community are, con-
ditions conducive to the general health and well being of the individual 
should be key. The rights in the Constitution concerning housing, health 
care, food, water, social security. education and the environment are 
central to ensuring the health and well-being of persons. The realisation of 
these socio-economic rights are therefore critical to local government's 
mandate to give priority to the basic needs of the community. In addition. 
it should be noted that local government has vast powers with regard to 
many functional areas listed in Part B of Schedule 4 and Part B of 
Schedule 5 that may impact on the actual realisation of the specific 
socio-economic rights:5 
For example. although housing per se is included in neither of these 
parts of these Schedules, man)' of the areas that relate to the adequacy of 
housing are included therein. 4 These areas relate to certain core factors to 
determining adequate housing that the UN Committee on Economic and 
Social Rights has noted in a General Comment. 41 These factors include 
legal security of tenure, the availability of services, materials, facilities, 
infrastructure, affordability, habitability, acceSSibility, location and cultural 
adequacy. For instance. in Schedule 4 Part B air pollution, building 
regulations. child care facilities, electricity and gas reticulation, municipal 
planning and municipal public transport all impact on the right of access 
to adequate housing. Furthermore. water and sanitation services, domestic 
waste-water and sewage disposal systems impact on the right of access to 
water, adequate housing and the environment. Municipal health services 
are also directly relevant to the realisation of the right of access to health 
. 48 care services. 
Part B of Schedule 5 also contains many areas that relate to the core 
factors that the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights has outlined 
45 S 156(lHa). 
46 S 26 of the Constitution makes express reFerence to adequate housing as opposed to 
housing per se. The UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights has accorded some 
attention to certain core factors relating to the adequacy of hOUSing. 
47 UN General Comment No 4, on "The right to adequate hOUSing (article 11(1) of the 
Covenant}" (Sixth session 1991) UN doc Ell 992/23 para 8. 
48 These examples are not intended to provide a comprehensive list of all of the 
functional areas of local government that impact on socio-economic rights but rather 
an illustration 0 f the Fact that there are a vast number of functional areas of local 
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as central to the determination of adequate housing. Beaches and amuse-
ment facilities. local amenities. local sports facilities. municipal parks and 
recreation as well as markets are central to both the availability of services 
and the location of the housing. Municipal roads are important for 
infrastructure and cleansing. noise pollution. refuse removal. refuse 
dumps and solid waste disposal are central to the general habitability of a 
house. Finally. the control of public nuisances. the control of undertakings 
that sell liquor to the public. licensing and control of undertakings that sell 
food to the public. street trading. street lighting and traffic and parking are 
factors critical to the location of housing. 
The substantial role of local government in the realisation of socio-
economic rights is further strengthened by reference to other sources. For 
example. the Water Services Act·9 and the Housing ActSO make reference to 
the role of local government in implementing each of these rights. 
In view of the aforementioned. it is clear that local government has a 
vital role to play in the realisation of the socio-economic rights listed in 
section 184(3) and is accordingly a relevant organ of state. 
In view of the numerous local governments in the country. directing 
requests for information to each and every local government would 
clearly carry with it severe cost and personnel implications for the Human 
Rights Commission. It is therefore suggested that the Human Rights Com-
mission instead target the South African Local Government AssociationS! 
(SALGA) with requests for information. SALGA is a representative structure 
of local government and has as one of its distinctive strengths the capacity 
"to act at the centre of a web of cross cutting inter-relationships between 
different spheres of government and different sectors of society ... 52 As 
SALGA itself does not have a specific mandate to realise socio-economic 
rights. it would not constitute a relevant organ of state. However. the fact 
that it is a representative structure of local government. and must in terms 
of the Human Rights Commission ActS; cooperate and assist the Com-
mission where possible can be used to justify it being targeted for in-
formation on socio-economic rights. SALGA should then assume 
responsibility for distributing the information to the various municipalities 
and compiling a comprehensive local government response to the Human 
Rights Commission. 
3.2 Any other constitutional functionary or institution 
A study of the powers and functions accorded to the state institutions in 
Chapter 9 of the Constitution makes clear that none of these institutions 
49 Water Services Act 108 of 1 997. 
50 Housing Act 107 of 1997. 
51 S 163 of the Constitution provides for the enactment of legislation on organised local 
government. The Organized Local Government Act 52 of 1997 has subsequently been 
passed. 
52 South African Local Government Association Business Plan 1998: 1. 
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have a specific mandate to realise socio-economic rights. These insti-
tutions would therefore not constitute relevant organs of state (as defined 
above) and cannot be targeted with requests for information in terms of 
the section 184(3) process. However, this does not preclude them from 
assisting and cooperating with the Human Rights Commission. In fact, 
section 7(2) of the Human Rights Commission Act obliges organs of state 
to assist and cooperate with the Human Rights Commission. For instance, 
the work of the Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights 
of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities will inevitably have certain 
consequences in the realm of education, and it might therefore be able to 
provide some useful information to the Human Rights Commission. The 
Commission for Gender Equality should also collaborate with the Human 
Rights Commission on issues pertaining to gender equality and socio--
economic rights. Its assistance may be of particular relevance in the con-
text of gathering disaggregated information. 
In view of the aforegoing, it is clear that the Chapter 9 state institutions, 
unlike national state departments, provincial governments or local govern-
ment, do not have a specific mandate to realise or implement socio-
economic rights. Their functions are limited to overseeing, promoting 
respect for human rights or gender equality, making recommendations 
etc, as opposed to undertaking substantive initiatives to convert the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution into reality. However, as has been 
noted, these institutions should assist and support the Human Rights Com-
mission in fulfilling its mandate of monitoring socio-economic rights, 
thereby acting as complementary bodies to the Human Rights Commission. 
3.3 Any other functionary or institution 
In view of the vast differences in the areas of work of parastatals, the 
varying extent of state funding, levels of autonomy etc, the relevance of 
particular parastatals to the realisation of socio-economic rights must be 
made individually. A blanket assessment of whether parastatals constitute 
relevant organs of state would be superficial as well as inaccurate. It is 
accordingly suggested that in making an assessment as to whether 
particular parastatals constitute relevant organs of state, due attention 
should be accorded to the relevance of their work to the realisation of 
socio-economic rights, the extent to which they are dependant on state 
funding and the extent of their affiliation to government. For example, a 
consideration of these factors is likely to result in the South African 
Housing Board and the Water Boards constituting relevant organs of state 
for the purposes of section 184(3). However, the challenge for the Human 
Rights Commission is coping with the practicalities of requesting and 
analysing information from the plethora of such bodies that may qualify 
as relevant organs of state. This issue gives rise to whether the Human 
Rights Commission has a discretion in the relevant organs of state that it 
targets for information. It is suggested that the Human Rights Commission 
is obliged to obtain information from the principal organs of state re-
sponsible for realising socio-economic rights. This category would for 
instance include the national, provincial and local spheres of government. 
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of the Constitution, for instance, expressly oblige the state to take certain 
measures to ensure the realisation of the rights of access to adequate housing. 
health care, food and water and social security. Express reference to obli-
gations on the part of the state, illustrates the importance of the Human Rights 
Commission requesting information from the three spheres of government. 
It is, however, contended that the Human Rights Commission be accorded 
some discretion in establishing the relevance of other organs of state. This 
category would include parastataJs such as the Water Boards. the Housing 
Board, the Development Bank of Southern Africa etc. For instance. the fact 
that the Development Bank of Southern Africa promotes economic develop-
ment, institutional capacity building and supports development projects 
and programmes in the region, indicates its relevance to the realisation of 
socio-economic rights. It should however lie within the discretion of the 
Human Rights Commission to decide whether it would qualify as a rele-
vant organ of state for the purposes of section 184(3). This suggestion 
accords with a purposive interpretation of section 184(3). In examining 
the purpose of the monitoring of socio-economic rights in terms of section 
184(3), some attention must be accorded to General Comment No 1 of the 
UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights.
54 
Although General Comment 
No 1 relates to monitoring socio-economic rights under the International 
Covenant on EconomiC, Social and Cultural Rights,55 it provides some 
useful insight into the general purpose of monitoring the implementation of 
socio-economic rights. In General Comment No 1, the UN Committee has 
outlined the following objectives that state reporting under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights seeks to achieve: 
• to ensure a comprehensive review of national legislation, adminis-
trative rules, procedures and practices are undertaken; 
• to ensure that the state party monitors the actual situation with respect 
to each of the rights and is aware of the extent to which these right are 
or are not being enjoyed; 
• to enable the government to demonstrate that principled policy making 
has been undertaken; 
• to allow public scrutiny of government poliCies and to encourage the 
involvement of different sectors of society in the formulation, imple-
mentation and review of relevant policies; 
• to provide a basis on which the state party and the committee can 
effectively evaluate the progress being made in realising the right; 
• to enable the state party to develop a better understanding of the problems 
and short comings to allow the progressive realisation of the right; and 
• to allow the exchange of information. 56 
54 See General Comment No 1 of the UN Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights 
on "Reporting by States parties" (Third Session, 1989) UN doc E/1989/22 paras 2-9. 
55 The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights is expected to be 
ratified by the South African government in the near future. 
56 General Comment No I of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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In view of the aforementioned, it is clear that the monitoring of socio-
economic rights by the Human Rights Commission should at least serve to 
assess and evaluate the formulation and implementation of legislation and 
policies and identify the gaps in ensuring the full realisation of socio-
economic rights. In order to achieve these objectives. it is vital the Human 
Rights Commission request information from those state departments and 
administration that are primarily concerned with the realisation of socio-
economic rights. 
However. in order for the Human Rights Commission to effectively 
achieve the aforementioned objectives. it might not be necessary to 
request information from all the relevant organs of state. Requesting 
certain organs of state for information in terms of section 184(3) should 
accordingly fall within the discretion of the Human Rights Commission. 
This contention is further strengthened by section 184(3) of the Constitution 
not requiring the Human Rights Commission to request information from 
all relevant organs of state. 
It is accordingly suggested that the Human Rights Commission is obliged 
to request information from the three spheres of government. given their 
critical role in realising socio-economic rights as well as the aforemen-
tioned purpose of monitoring socio-economic rights. However, in line with 
the purpose of monitoring socio-economic rights and in order for the 
Human Rights Commission to effectively monitor the three spheres of 
government. it should be accorded some discretion in requesting infor-
mation from relevant organs of state that are not primarily concerned with 
the realisation of socio-economic rights. Furthermore, it should be noted that 
the latter organs of state may vary from year to year depending on the 
extent to which their work affects the realisation of socio-economic rights. 
4 THE OBLIGATION OF RELEVANT ORGANS OF STATE TO 
PROVIDE THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION WITH THE 
INFORMATION THAT IT REQUESTS 
In spite of the clarity of section 184(3) that the Human Rights Commission 
has a constitutional mandate to request information from relevant organs 
of state on the steps that they have taken in realising the stipulated socio-
economic rights. it is less clear on whether the relevant organs of state are 
obliged to provide the Commission with the necessary information. The 
concern arises from the omission of an express provision regarding the 
obligations imposed on the relevant organs of state in the Constitution. 
A duty on the relevant organs of state to provide the Human Rights 
Commission with information could be based on three grounds. The first 
is a very basic principle of the law. that for every legal right there exists a 
corresponding legal obligation. When applied to the issue at hand. it 
means that the Human Rights Commission has a constitutional power to 
request information from the relevant organs of state on the steps they 
have taken in the realisation of socio-economic rights which imposes a 
corresponding obligation on all relevant organs of state to provide the 
Human Rights Commission with such information. Second, in terms of the 
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organs of state within each sphere must co-operate with one another in 
mutual trust and good faith by, [inter alia], assisting and supporting one 
another. informing one another of. and consulting one another on. matters 
of common interest and co-ordinating their actions and legislation with 
one another".s7 When the section is applied to the present task. it would 
require that all relevant organs of state are obliged to "assist and support" 
the Commission. "inform and consult" with the Commission on matters of 
common interest as well as to "co-ordinate their actions and legislation" 
with the Human Rights Commission in fulfilling its task of monitoring 
socio-economic rights. Third and perhags most compelling, is by reference 
to the Human Rights Commission Act. The relevant section provides that 
organs of state are obliged to afford the Commission such assistance "as 
may be required for the effective exercising of its powers and per-
formance of its duties and functions". 
In view of the aforegoing it is clear that although the Constitution makes 
no express provision for relevant organs of state to provide the Human 
Rights Commission with information, in accordance with both. the concept 
of reCiprocal rights and obligations in law and the principles of co-operative 
governance, all relevant organs of state are obliged to provide the Com-
mission with the information that it so requests. 
5 INADEQUATE REPORTS OR THE FAILURE BY RELEVANT 
ORGANS OF STATE TO REPORT TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS 
COMMISSION 
Whilst the relevant organs of state do have a legal obligation to provide 
the Human Rights Commission with information requested, the present 
section will examine the options available to the Commission should they 
nevertheless fail to do so. Some gUidance will be sought from international 
law in this regard as the failure of states parties to provide supervising 
bodies with reports has been an area of much concern in this context. 
In terms of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. state parties are required to submit reports on measures that they 
have adopted and progress being made in achieving the observance of the 
rights recognised in the Covenant.so However, the failure of state parties to 
submit these reports has been a major problem facing the Committee on 
Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 60 In an attempt to deal with the 
problem. the Committee has began notifying state parties of its intention 
to consider these reports at specified future sessions. Should the state party 
in question still fail to furnish the Committee with the report. the Committee 
considers the status of economic. social and cultural rights in a particular 
state party in the light of all available information.
61 
Such information 
57 S 41 (1) Constitution. 
58 S 7(2) Human Rights Commission Act 54 of 1994. 
59 Article 16(1). International Covenant on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights. 
60 The Committee on Economic. Social and Cultural Rights is the supervising body under 
the ICESCR. 
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normally includes information received from NGOs within that particular 
state party. 
It is suggested that the Human Rights Commission adopt a similar approach 
in dealing with relevant organs of state that fail to report or submit 
inadequate reports. It is contended that the Human Rights Commission 
may exercise any of the following options or combination of options: 
• It can request the relevant organ of state in question for information 
again and specify a time frame within which such information must be 
received as well as the consequences of failure to respond; 
• it can report to Parliament the failure of specific relevant organs of 
state to respond; 
• it can communicate to NGOs the failure of specific relevant organs of 
state to respond; and 
• it can compile a report on the basis of all available information in-
cluding information received from NGOs. 
6 CONCLUSION 
Whilst the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the South African Con-
stitution is laudable, it must be acknowledged that critical to its success is 
a proper monitoring of its implementation. In undertaking this task, the 
Human Rights Commission faces numerous challenges. This paper has 
sought to address the challenge of defining a "relevant organ of state" in 
section 184(3) by providing a definition of the organs of state that are rele-
vant to the realisation of socio-economic rights. However, the challenge 
for the Human Rights Commission lies far beyond this. It is required not 
only to identify these organs of state and provide them with requests for 
information, but also to secure their cooperation in the process in order to 
obtain the necessary information so as to meaningfully fulfil its consti-
tutional mandate of monitoring the realisation of socio-economic rights. 
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